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ABSTRACT: 
This paper studies ini t ial public offerings (IPOs) pr ic ing and 
underpricing phenomena in China's segmented stock markets ( A & B share 
market) during the period f rom 1996 to 2000. 
First, we introduce the regulations and procedures regarding the 
pr ic ing and distribution mechanisms for Chinese IPOs activities. 
Comparing w i th practices o f developed markets, the Chinese mechanism 
appears simple and lack o f f lexibi l i ty. Especially when Chinese stock 
market is developing fast, the original mechanism needs development and 
these foreign practices should be the great references for Chinese IPO 
market, for example: book-bui lding system, auction pr ic ing, etc., and these 
mechanism can help to value IPOs more accurately. 
Second, we present empirical results and analysis for Chinese IPO 
pr ic ing w i th a Log Linear Model , and f ind that IPO price is related to some 
elemental factors, such as price to earning (PE) ratio, IPO size, Industrial 
factors, etc; the result is consistent w i th the situation o f Chinese IPO 
market: under f ixed pr ic ing mechanism that exists for a long t ime, PE ratio 
and other element factors have great effect on IPO price. 
Third, we study the underpricing phenomena o f Chinese stock market, 
and we f ind extremely high IPO underpricing exists in A-share market, 
much higher than B-shares. Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission 
i 
(CSRC) and other government agencies restrict the size and valuation o f 
new offerings by Quota system and IPO f ixed pr ic ing method; and 
domestic investors have l imited investment alternatives. The two reasons 
cause the excessive demand on A-shares, hence w i t h a higher underpricing 
in A-share market than for B-shares. We t ry to explain Chinese 
underpricing phenomena w i th some theoretical models, and f ind some are 
consistent to theories and some are not. We employ a linear regression 
model to explore the possible determinants affecting underpricing 
respectively in A and B-share market, and finds the same explanatory 
variables works in A-share market but not in B-share market, wh ich shows 
that B-share market is more disordered. And most factors only affecting the 
aftermarket price have significant effect on underpricing both in A-share 
and B-share markets; it tells that underpricing is main ly determined by the 
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From 1991 to 2001, i t is the f lour ishing t ime for China's stock market 
to develop; the number o f in i t ia l publ ic offerings (IPOs) has varied f rom 
year to year, w i t h some years fewer than 100, and other years more than 
200. These IPOs total ly raise A-share IPOs Y 3 8 7 . 1 9 6 b i l l ion , B-share 
IPOs US$4,632 b i l l ion and H-shares US$18,227 b i l l i on in gross proceeds. 
A t the end o f the first trading day, the shares are traded on average 143.35 
percent above the IPO price in our sample, much higher than 18.8 percent 
o f U S A (Ritter reported, f rom 1980 to 2001). Go ing w i t h the h igh 
underpricing rate, oversubscription is also extraordinari ly higher than other 
markets, wh ich is averaged 83.3 times as many as the IPOs in A-share 
market f rom 1996 to 2000，and extremely 217.4 times in 2000, much 
higher than 35 times in H-share market.® The simple fundamental market 
misvaluat ion is unl ike ly to explain so h igh an average f irst-day return 
143.35 percent reported in the paper. We believe the government 
interference and scarcity o f investment alternatives for domestic investors, 
such as quota system and f ixed pr ic ing mechanism, hence causing excess 
demand over l imi ted supply, are the main dr iver for such a phenomenon. 
Chen and Gao (1999), and Su and Fleisher (1999) have studied IPO 
� Zhao, 1999, gets the H-share averaged oversubscription multiple from 15 H-shares listed before 1995; and 
recently the H-share averaged oversubscription multiple has a trend to decrease. 
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underpricing in Chinese stock market. Di f ferent ly w i t h them, this paper 
first studies IPO pricing, and then extends to underpricing issue, 
systematically studies IPO activities in Chinese stock market. As for the 
data, 1996-2000, this paper is the continued work o f the other two papers: 
Chen and Gao (1999), 1991-1996, Su and Fleisher (1999), 1987-1995. 
We first review different explanations for the underpricing in issuing 
activity, and then introduce the pricing and distr ibution mechanism in 
Chinese stock market. Under this mechanism, we discuss pr ic ing and 
underpricing phenomena. As Chinese stock market has some unique 
features, we examine what explanations that can explain underpricing in 
developed markets are applicable in China's stock market; for example, the 
signaling explanation is not work ing in the Chinese stock market, wh ich is 
certainly the main reason for other markets. As for pr ic ing and 
underpricing issue, empirical results show that IPO price is h ighly 
correlated to some fundamental elements, such as price to earning ratio (PE 
ratio), IPO size and so on; and the high IPO underpricing is mainly 
determined by the after-market price. 
This paper is organized as fol lows. In Chapter 2, Review o f Theories 
and Literature; Chapter 3, Introduction o f China's IPO Market②；Chapter 4, 
Empir ical Results and Analysis o f Chinese IPO Pricing; Chapter 5, 
Theoretical Explanations o f Underpr ic ing Based on Chinese IPO 
� IPO market means the first market or primary market, related to IPO issuing, pricing and distribution, in 
contrast with the secondary market related to stock trading. 
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Behaviors; Chapter 6, Empir ical Results and Analysis o f Underpr ic ing in 
China's Market; Chapter 7, Further Development o f Chinese Stock Market; 
Chapter 8: Conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Review of Theories and Literature 
2.1 Theoretical Explanations for IPO Underpricing: 
Modern theories o f IPO pricing offer various explanations for 
underpricing, and these explanations arise f rom important informational 
asymmetries between market participants. Since an IPO involves four 
relevant groups o f actors - the issuing f i rm, the underwriters, the ini t ia l 
buyers, and the investors in the secondary market — the information known 
to these various groups is critical. The widely discussed theories o f IPO 
underpricing differ in their assumptions about wh ich actors have superior 
information. The fo l lowing are some theoretical models o f IPO: 
(1). Signaling Model of Underpricing: 
Signaling model assumes that the issuing f i rm knows more about its 
prospects than do any other market participants, coinciding quite closely 
w i th an important area o f modern finance theory: f i r m insiders know more 
than outsiders. Appl icat ion o f the signaling mechanism to model ing an IPO 
relies on the idea that f irms are differentiated by their values, and these 
values, whi le unobserved by potential investors. H igh qual i ty f i rms would 
obviously l ike to convince investors o f their good quali ty by real izing 
greater proceeds f rom the sales o f their securities later. Yet, only claims o f 
h igh quality may be unconvincing. Hence, the f i rms need to f ind some 
4 
action that is unl ikely to be imitated by low quali ty f i rms seeking to 
mislead potential investors. The level o f retention o f shares by the original 
owners can be a convincing signal o f f i rm value to outsiders. A n d Welch 
(1989) thinks underpricing is also a signal that can't be imitated easily by 
low quality firms. Under such a situation: only the h igh quali ty f irms can 
issue seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), thus, shares are underpriced now 
to prove they are good so that later offerings (SEOs) can br ing back higher 
proceeds. 
(2). Baron's Principal-Agent Model of Underpricing: 
Baron (1982) applies principal-agent analysis to the IPO underpricing. 
He assumes that the investment bankers/underwriters have information 
superior to that o f the f i rm. This information may represent intimate 
knowledge o f market conditions, investor contacts, or industry trends 
relevant to the issuer's financial prospects. Analysis focuses on the opt imal 
behavior o f the issuing f i rm (the principal) and the investment banker (the 
agent) hired to execute the offerings. I f by a commitment offering, the 
underwriter 's superior information and risk can be compensated by the 
underpriced offerings and the issuer also reduces the costs o f getting 
truthful advice f rom the banker. Underpricing can arise in Baron's model 
only when the investment banker has information superior to the issuer. I f 
both had symmetric information, a f i rm commitment of fer ing w i t h no 
5 
advising would arise and underpricing would not occur and moral hazard 
would be absent. However, this argument is weakened by the clever test by 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989), who examine ini t ia l excess return 
behavior in IPOs o f shares in the investment banks themselves. In these 
“se l f marketed IPOs", an investment bank "goes publ ic " and distributes its 
own shares, since here the principal and agent are the same f i rm, no 
information asymmetry should arise, yet, a result not supportive o f Baron's 
explanation. 
(3). Best Efforts Vs Firm Commitment Contract Model: 
The analysis o f Sherman (1992) on the pr ic ing o f best efforts offer ing 
provides additional insights on the offer ing selection problem. Most 
models o f underpricing, when they make assumption at all, assume a f i rm 
commitment offer ing form. Yet it is clear that f i rm commitment and best 
efforts offerings exhibit important empirical differences. Under a f i rm 
commitment contract, the risk transfers to underwriters and underpricing is 
compensation to the risk. Unl ike a f i rm commitment contract, a best efforts 
of fer ing bestows no insurance benefits on the issuing f i rm. The underwriter 
doesn't actually underwrite the issue, but instead provides only a 
distributional and advising role. From the issuer's point o f view, the best 
effort of fer ing has the possibi l i ty o f failure. On the empir ical side, 
statistical evidence shows that best efforts offerings tend to riskier and 
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more underpriced on average. 
(4) The Presale Information Gathering Model: 
Benvensite and Spindt (1989) emphasize the role o f market 
information acquisition by investment bankers through "presale 
solicitations o f interest". Prior to choosing price for a new issue, 
investment banks form a "roadshow" and make presentations to potential 
investors, brokers, and others. Wi th the feedback information, underwriters 
can establish a reasonable price. And the Benvensite and Spindt (1989) 
resemble a k ind o f auction mechanism and have several interesting 
empirical implications. When some favorable news leads to more favorable 
forecasts, underpricing levels rise. Extensive presale should also indicate 
greater underpricing. 
(5) Reallocation Theory & Winner's Curse: 
Mi l le r (1977) proposes reallocation theory and suggests that IPO 
underpricing actually reflects the effects o f investor divergence o f opinion 
and rationing in oversubscribed offerings. In simple terms, suppose that 
investors place a wide variety o f values on IPO shares. I f rat ioning occurs 
in the sale, then in general no guarantee that those investors can obtain 
their desired holdings. Once secondary market trading begins, the shares 
are reallocated towards the highest evaluators, and competi t ion for shares 
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leads to the first day price increase. However, such divergence wou ld 
appear to imply a "winner 's curse", which means a losing posit ion that one 
buys only those shares overestimated their values. 
(6). Other Explanations of Underpricing: 
Some other explanations start f rom a special perspective, some are 
theoretically coherent and can be considered as at least partial alternative 
explanations for this puzzling phenomenon. These theories o f underpricing 
include: 
The adverse selection model proposed by Rock (1986), wh ich is a 
famous one; however in this paper, we are unable to examine this theory in 
China's market for the data constraint. The Rock Mechanism views 
underpricing is a consequence o f informational asymmetries among 
potential investors. In particular, investors are differentiated by their levels 
o f information about the true value o f the issue, w i t h " in formed 
investors"(II 's) and "uninformed investors" (UI 's) . As a consequence o f 
this asymmetry, IPs compete w i th UI 's only for "good" issues, creating an 
adverse selection mechanism in which UI 's obtain shares in "bad" issues 
w i th greater probability. That is, the uninformed bidder suffers f rom the 
problem named "winner's curse": he achieves a large allotment for bad 
IPOs and a small allotment for good IPOs. In order to induce UI 's to 
participate in the IPO market, issuers need offerings to be underpriced as 
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compensation for the uninformed. 
Welch offers an interesting dynamic model, "Cascades" theory, alone 
among underpricing models. Whi le all previous models impl ic i t ly assume 
that investor purchases o f shares occur at a single point in t ime, Welch 
argues that later potential investors may learn f rom observing the behavior 
o f earlier ones. When early selling activity results in later investors buying, 
a chain reaction, termed a "cascade" by Welch. Because offerings should 
succeed or fai l quickly, the issuers may have an incentive to reduce ini t ia l 
price to induce the first investors, or to perhaps bribe early potential 
investors. 
Boehmer and Fishe (2000) proposed a new explanation for 
underpricing that trading volume in the secondary market has impact on 
the underpricing. They note that trading volume in the aftermarket is higher, 
the greater is underpricing. And some evidence shows the relation o f the 
argument. 
2.2 Empirical Studies Review on China's IPOs: 
Chen and Gao (1999), and Su and Fleisher (1999) respectively make 
some empirical tests on China's IPO markets. 
Chen and Gao (1999) figure that China's stock market has f ive main 
factors that are distinctive f rom the mature markets: Market segmentation, 
A & B shares are apart; State, legal entity and individual 's shares are apart; 
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The t ime lag between IPO announcement and going to public is very long; 
Managers own a small number o f shares; Most shares belong to the nation 
or the local government before or after going public. 
Chen and Gao (1999) defines U R as underpricing ratio: 
p J 
UR = — ^③：F\= Closing price o f the first trading day; Pq= IPO price; 
Pq ,0 
/ , 二 Closing Index o f the first trading day; /。=Closing Index o f the IPO 
announcement day; and data is f rom 1991 to 1996. 
Chen and Gao (1999) points that the underpricing is related to the 
t ime elapsed between IPO date and first market trading date; and it is also 
related to the potential SEOs. He argues that a h igh underpricing rate is 
used to compensate the return o f the fund frozen for a long t ime before 
going public. And a f i rm w i th potential SEOs has a higher underpricing 
rate, because it can recoup the loss in the later SEOs, consistent w i th the 
Welch's theory. 
Chen and Gao (1999) point: underpricing ratio o f B shares is much 
lower than A shares, because the investors in B-share market are mostly 
foreign institutional investors, and they w i l l balance return and risk when 
investing, so the B-share market is near to the developed markets, less 
bubbly than A-share market. And Shenzhen's B-share U R is signif icantly 
higher than Shanghai's. According to Chen and Gao's view, many 
� The definition of UR in this paper is different with Chen and Gao (1999); it is same with Su and Fleisher 
(1999), a s U R = ( / ? , - p j / P q . 
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investors at Shenzhen's B-share market come f rom Hong Kong, and most 
o f them are individual investors, seeking short-run return; whi le Shanghai's 
investors come f rom all over the world, and most o f them are institutional 
investors, who pay attention to the long-run return. The short-run activity 
adds the market volat i l i ty and increases the IPO underpricing. In B-share 
market, the tests o f factors that can lead underpricing are all 
non-significant, and even some signs are opposite to the expectation. Chen 
and Gao (1999) explains that the reason lies in that the foreign investors 
have some di f f icul ty to distinguish the high quality f irms f rom the low 
quality firms, so the underpricing o f the observations behaves randomly. 
Su and Fleisher (1999) adopts existing theoretical analysis to consider 
the peculiarities o f the IPO process and to explain the reason for 
extraordinarily high IPO underpricing in Chinese Stock market. The 
sample includes 318 IPOs before 1996. Su and Fleisher (1999) define IPO 
init ial return as IPORETN= 一p^)/Pq and consider the fo l lowing three 
hypotheses: The extraordinary large IPO underpricing in China can be 
explained by a signaling model in terms o f a strategy for f irms to signal 
their values to investors; underpricing in china is pr imar i ly explainable as a 
means o f bribing public officials by the firms to gain favoritism. Al locat ing 
IPO shares by lottery mechanism has been a cause o f extreme underpricing. 
However he can't quantify the second assumption o f bribe and leave the 
11 
question open. 
Su and Fleisher (1999) tests the correlation between underpricing and 
IPO price, issuer's intrinsic value, SEOs and factional ownership, etc., and 
concludes there is strong evidence that supports the signaling model 
l ink ing IPO underpricing to SEOs. Chinese issuers who underprice their 
A-share IPOs more heavily are more l ikely to return to the secondary 
market and issue larger number o f after-market equities. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
Introduction of China's IPO Market 
3.1 Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC): 
The first question must be "why do f irms go publ ic?" In most cases, 
the pr imary answer is the desire to raise equity capital for the f i rm and to 
create a public market in which the founders and other shareholders can 
convert some o f their wealth into cash at a future date. However, in China, 
the stock market is only for state-owned enterprises and few private f irms 
can go public on domestic stock market, so the intention o f going public is 
to assist the reform o f state-owned enterprises and help them to raise 
capital and reform the structure o f ownership, then to improve the f i rms 
efficiency. Under this circumstance, Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) and other government agencies control all IPO 
activities, including quota and pricing, in order to assist the reform o f 
state-owned enterprises. Before 2000, f irms that want to go public must 
apply for the quota f rom the provincial government or the related 
ministries, and the quota is vi tal for the f irms to go publ ic; successively, 
such mechanism inevitably results in some corruption; further more, i t 
l imits the supply o f IPO, together w i th the situation that there are l i t t le 
investment alternatives for Chinese investors, and causes the h igh stock 
13 
prices in the secondary market. Fortunately, the quota system was 
abandoned by CSRC in March 2000，substituted by authorizing system®. 
CSRC doesn't restrict the quota o f IPOs and adopt the market-oriented 
criteria; i t means any f irms that meet the conditions can issue IPOs; CSRC 
changes its role f rom everything to only ver i fy ing whether the f irms meet 
the conditions. Further, authorizing system is also a watershed for IPO 
pr ic ing mechanism. Before it, f irms adopted f ixed pr ic ing mechanism to 
price IPOs and PE ratio is an important factor; yet, PE ratio is control led by 
CSRC; under this mechanism, the issuers have l i t t le elasticity, once the PE 
ratio is set, then the IPO price is settled according to its per share earning. 
Wh i le under the authorizing system, CSRC relaxed the restrictions on the 
pr ic ing; IPO price is determined by the negotiation o f issuers and 
underwriters, and CSRC doesn't interfere w i th it. The issuers have more 
elasticity to decide how to price IPOs, and can practice some more f lexible 
pr ic ing mechanism, such as book-bui lding, auction pr ic ing, etc. We can see 
that authorizing system is transferring IPO activit ies f rom being regulated 
to the market orientation. Now, under the new system, some f i rms try the 
book-bui ld ing practice to issue IPOs, such as SinoPec Corporat ion (600028) 
and Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporat ion (600019); because 
book-bui ld ing can gauge the demand o f potential investors we l l and can 
value IPOs accurately; it is a trend for the IPO pr ic ing in Chinese stock 
® Authorizing system are also named as chartered system and verification system. 
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market, especially for the large proceeds. And some f irms t ry auction 
pr ic ing for they can get a high IPO price, such as Ningbo B i rd Co. 
(600130), Fujian Mindong Electric Power Co. Ltd. (000993), etc. 
3.2 How to Price and Distribute IPOs: 
How to price and distribute IPOs depends on the rules by Chinese 
authorities. In China, as the market develops, some different pr ic ing and 
distribution methods have been tried. The fol lowings are the mechanisms 
that Chinese IPOs have been priced and distributed. 
First, Fixed Pricing (PE pricing)⑤： 
In Chinese stock market, a large port ion o f IPOs adopt PE pr ic ing to 
price the offerings, especially during the time o f quota system; under this 
system, IPO price is computed l ike this: IPO p r i c e : (Af ter tax per share 
earnings) x PE. 
There are two phases in quota system: 
The first phase is f rom 1990 to 1998. Dur ing this period, PE ratio is 
bundled f rom 12 to 15; most IPOs can't exceed the upper PE l imi t 15 
except only a few firms w i th auction pr ic ing mechanism. A n d the 
def ini t ion o f earnings that is used to compute IPO price has changed twice. 
Before December 1996, usually forecast earnings are used. Af ter 1996, in 
® Fixed pricing is the first stage for Chinese IPO pricing; under this mechanism, CSRC can control the PE 
ratio and IPO price avoiding too much bubble in the first market 
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order to avoid the firms to exaggerate the forecast earnings, CSRC 
requested firms to use the three-year realized averaged earnings for pricing. 
Another change happened in March 1998, and CSRC proposed to use the 
weighted average earnings, which is the combination o f the former two 
styles for IPO pricing, w i th the realized earnings and forecast both. The 
reason is that the stock price should reflect not only the history but also the 
prospects. A t the same time, in order to avoid the untrue forecast, CSRC 
sets another rule: i f a f i rm's realized earnings are 20% less than the forecast, 
besides the f i rm's explanation and apology, CSRC w i l l have an 
investigation on it, and even make a punishment. 
The second phase is f rom late 1998 to March 2000. Dur ing this period, 
CSRC loosened PE ratio and didn' t set l imi t any more. As a result, the 
average PE ratio in IPO pric ing improves very fast f rom 16.85 in 1999 to 
28.43 in 2000. 
Af ter March 2000, authorizing system is implemented, most f irms sti l l 
adopt PE ratio pr icing mechanism to float IPOs and the change is that PE 
ratio increases a lot. A t the same time, discounted cash f low and other 
pr ic ing methods are introduced, however, they are only complements and a 
small port ion in the pricing. 
Second, Book-building Pricing Mechanism®: 
® Book-building Pricing Mechanism is widely adopted in US, Hong Kong and other markets; however, it 
began in China a short time ago. 
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In the American stock market, the common practice o f 
"book-bui ld ing" allows underwriters to obtain information f rom potential 
investors. Wi th book-bui lding mechanism, a prel iminary of fer ing price 
range is set, and then underwriters and issuers go on a "road show" to 
market the company for the prospective investors. This road show helps 
underwriters to obtain demand information at each price level. I f there is 
strong demand, the underwriters w i l l set a higher of fer ing price. I f the 
quantity o f demand can't meet the number o f IPOs, then a lower price w i l l 
be adjusted. To induce more potential investors and get the detailed 
demand curve, the road show w i l l be held in many cities. Partly because it 
results in more accurate pricing than f ixed pricing, many countries move to 
book-bui ld ing system in recent years, most often in the case o f large 
offerings. Denmark, Finland, and Japan are among these countries. N o w in 
China's stock market, some firms have tried this method and it is a good 
start for f irms to market and price their IPOs w i th book-bui ld ing system. 
However, road show can't predict the performance after going public, 
especially when the after-market performance is quite wel l , namely a 
higher underpricing than expected, then the f i rms lose the opportunity to 
raise more proceeds. Thus it requests underwriters not only have the price 
discretion but also have the quantity discretion. In allocation, they also 
need to control how many shares in the aggregate are allocated. In order to 
avoid the loss f rom high underpricing, almost al l IPOs contain an 
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overallotment option for up to 15 percent o f the shares offered, wh ich is 
called a "Green Shoe" option, f irst ly appearing at the IPO o f a Green Shoe 
Co. in U.S. in 1963. In allocating shares, i f there is strong demand in road 
show, the underwriter w i l l allocate 115 percent o f the shares. The extra 15 
percent proceeds are controlled by underwriters for a certain t ime. I f the 
price weakens in aftermarket trading, the underwriter can buy back up to 
the extra 15 percent and retire the shares, as i f they had never been offered 
in the first place. I f the price performs wel l for a certain t ime, then the extra 
proceeds w i l l be returned to the issuers. 
Third, Auction Pricing®: 
Some Chinese IPOs have experimented this auction pr ic ing 
mechanism, but not successful. There were four companies to try auction 
pr ic ing mechanism during the period f rom June 1994 to January 1995. The 
four f irms were Harbin Shirble Electric-Heat (600864), Qinghai Sunshine 
and People Pharmaceutical Industry Co. (600869), X iamen Overseas 
Chinese Electronic Co. (600870) and Hainan Jinpan Enterprise Co. 
(000572). They marketed their IPOs w i th a base price and no upper l imi t ; 
the subscribers b id the price w i th demand, then the prices were ranked 
f rom the highest to the lowest, and IPO price was produced where the 
accumulative quantity just met the quantity o f offerings. A l l subscription 
� Auction pricing mechanism is just like the auction, which means who paying the highest price can get the 
shares. This pricing mechanism can reflect the market better than other mechanisms, however, if under 
asymmetric situation, then the mechanism is not as efficient as expectation. 
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w i t h prices beyond the crit ical price could obtain the offerings. 
The auction pr ic ing mechanism could help the issuers to raise more 
proceeds. However, the winner 's curse was more l i ke ly to happen and 
evidence f rom the four f irms proved this. Three f i rms: Harb in Shirble 
Electr ic-Heat (600864), Qinghai Sunshine and People Pharmaceutical 
Industry Co. (600869), Xiamen Overseas Chinese Electronic Co. (600870), 
got a f inal IPO price much higher than the base price, respectively 3 8 % 、 
167% and 1 4 1 %，h o w e v e r , once the offerings were traded on the 
secondary market, the trading price plummeted much below the IPO price. 
Even worse, Hainan Jinpan Enterprise Co. (000572) fai led to f loat IPOs 
because only 47.3% were sold and underwriters bought out the left shares. 
CSRC suspended this pr ic ing mechanism on t ime and no other f i rms 
attempted such auction pr ic ing f rom then on. 
Indeed, such auction mechanism that the four f i rms adopted is a pure 
market pr ic ing mechanism, we named complete market auction pr ic ing. It 
is not eff ic ient under the asymmetric informat ion; under this situation, the 
investors are asymmetrical ly informed and their assessments are o f much 
difference; only the ones w i t h the highest price can obtain the offerings; 
however, they have a great probabi l i ty to overvalue the offerings; at that 
t ime, winner 's curse w i l l happen. So the complete market pr ic ing is 
inef f ic ient under the asymmetric information. 
Indeed, the auction pr ic ing mechanism can be adjusted to improve the 
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efficiency. In the fo l lowing discussion, we w i l l introduce two improving 
methods: one is to preset oversubscription and the other is to set a 
benchmark price. We name the former as preset oversubsription and the 
later as benchmark pricing. Then the fo l lowing is the details. First, we set 
some variables: the quantity o f IPO is N and IPO price is p^. Subscribers' 
b id is p,. and demand is 仏.. 
Preset Oversubscription: 
First, all the investors give the bids p,. and demand quantity q^. 
Second, issuers and underwriters set an oversubcription multiples Q , 
namely Q * N subscription is val id for the IPO allocation. In order to 
prevent some non-rational investors set a very high price to obtain the 
offerings, a port ion o f subscription w i th the highest price w i l l be treated 
inval id, and we mark the price as p and the port ion as a • Af ter ranking 
and taking the inval id port ion out, the underwriters accumulate the demand 
quantity f rom the top on. When the accumulative quantity just amounts to 
Q *N , namely, ^ = O N , at this point, p^ comes into being. A l l the 
subscribers w i th p^ < p. < p are val id for the IPO allocation, rationed 
either by pro rata or by drawing lots. I f the total number o f subscription is 
less than the offerings issued, the all the subscribers obtain the offerings at 
the base price and the underwriters buy out the left. 
Benchmark Pricing: 
First, investors give their price assessment to the IPO, , and 
2 0 
demand n u m b e r ,仏. . S e c o n d , issuers and underwriters decide what 
benchmark price is be used, median, mean or weighted mean (Weighted 
mean uses the demand quantity at each price as the weight). Once the 
benchmark price is decided, the allocation area is centered at benchmark 
and extends two sides both upside and downside by price unit. When the 
quantity locates in the critical area is just equal to IPOs, ^q； = N , then 
upper price p叩 and lower price p,^^ are the crit ical price. And the lower 
price Plow is the IPO price Pq • Usually the demand between the crit ical 
prices seldom happens to be the exactly equal to quantity o f offerings and 
usually larger than it, so rationing offerings by pro rata or drawing lots is 
used for the subscribers w i th p,^^ < p^ < p叩. 
The two auction pricing mechanisms are the improvement o f 
complete market auction pricing; they are a compromise between f ixed 
pr ic ing and complete market auction pricing. They can make up the defect 
by the information asymmetry and protect the interest o f investors w i th 
inferior information to some extent. Comparing w i th f ixed pr ic ing, they are 
more accurate and flexible, meaningful to d iminish the extensive 
underpricing in China's stock market. 
Af ter authorizing system exists, some f irms try the auction pr ic ing 
mechanism in a special way, which means issuers preset the proceeds first, 
then according to bidding price that ensures the planned proceeds, to 
compute the quantity o f IPOs; we name this as proceeds-preset auction 
21 
pr ic ing method. H igh offering price allows a f i rm to raise the same amount 
o f capital without issuing as many as shares, reducing the di lut ion o f 
existing shareholder' interests, as discussed by Barry (1989). According to 
the company law, pubic shares must occupy at least 25% o f the total shares 
after going public; hence, this auction mechanism has an upper l imi t o f the 
IPO price intangibly. Once the proceeds are settled, the IPO price 
increasing means less public offerings; however, there is a crit ical ratio: 
IPOs must take up at least 25% o f total shares, so there is a bot tom line for 
the quantity o f public offerings, that is to say, a upper l im i t to IPO price. 
The advantage o f this method is that it can help to decrease the gap 
between IPO price and the trading price, that it can issue less shares to 
guarantee the interest o f original share-holders; yet, the disadvantage is not 
helpful to the dif fusion o f ownership structure. Ningbo B i rd Co. (600130) 
is the first IPO to try this way and the quantity o f publ ic offerings just 
meets the lower l imi t 25% o f the total shares. Some f i rms fo l low this 
pr ic ing mechanism and Fujian Mindong Electric Power L imi ted creates the 
highest PE ratio 88.69 in China's stock market. B y this means, the f irms 
w i th this pr ic ing mechanism actually get the realized proceeds higher than 
planned, seeing extra proceeds and extra ratio in the table 1. 
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Table 1: 
Characteristics o f Proceeds-preset Auct ion Pricing 
Currency ( R M B ) 
Company PE ratio Oversub Base Realized Extra Extra 
code -scription Price IPO price Proceeds Ratio (%) 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ n r n M B O K B H ^ K B ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S B ^ ^ a a c ^ s s B B O B ^ ^ B s n s ^ B ^ ^ ^ B ^ B s s a s ^ B ^ s a ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ R ^ ^ ^ s 
000983 33.8 4.87 4.8 6.49 479630000 34.7 
600296 29.09 6.45 6.88 7.68 610000 0.07 
600018 27.33 4.62 9.00 11.98 158000000 0.62 
000991 61.83 1.02 7.36 16.88 268000000 18.9 
600130 49.71 4.77 8.28 16.00 50000000 8.5 
000993 88.69 1.00 4.58 11.50 692000000 151 
1 
Note: 
000983: Shanxi Xishan Coal Electricity Power Co.Ltd; 600296: LanZhou Aluminium Co. Ltd; 
600018: Port Container Co. Ltd; 000991: Tonghai High Technology Co. Ltd. (Jinlin, China) 
600130: Ningbo Bird Co. Ltd; 000993: Fujian Mindong Electric Power Co. Ltd. 
Oversubscription: how many times is the subscription as many as quantity of IPOs. 
Extra Proceeds =(realized proceeds)- (planned proceeds); and extra ratio = (Realized proceeds 
-planned proceeds)/planned proceeds. 
Auct ion pr ic ing is now applied in some markets, such as Taiwan 
province, Japan and France, etc., and some difference exists in the detailed 
operation, such as, the qualif ication o f the auction bidders: some countries 
propose institutional investors whi le others propose all investors, allocation 
mechanism: rationing pro rata or drawing lots, and paying means: two 
kinds o f paying means for the bidding winners to pay; one is American 
Paying Mechanism that requests the winners to pay the price that they b id 
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and the other is Dutch Paying Mechanism that has a unif ied price that the 
winners need to pay. According to China's Company law, the shares must 
be paid at the same price at one issuance, including institutional investors 
and individual investors. Thus only Dutch Paying Mechanism is feasible in 
China's stock market. 
The auction pricing mechanisms in different countries can give much 
experience to Chinese IPO pricing, and the fo l lowing is the Singapore 
case: 
Two-Staged Auction Pricing: 
Another auction pricing mechanism named two-staged auction pr ic ing 
mechanism is applied in Singapore. Two-staged pr ic ing mechanism means 
that the pr ic ing is made at different time: the first stage is to float the IPOs 
to the public w i th a f ixed price and the second stage is to f loat the IPOs to 
institutional investors by the auction mechanism. The second stage w i l l 
induce the institutional investors to balance their bids w i th the f i rms' 
intrinsic value, because there are some cheaper stakes on the market. B y 
this means, it diminishes the speculation much. Specifically, this 
mechanism also has two IPO prices, which is forbidden by China's laws; it 
is only a reference for the future. 
3.3 Valuing IPOs and Setting Base Price: 
Same methods can be used to value IPOs and to set base price for 
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auction pricing. Regarding f ixed pricing, the base price is namely the IPO 
price; whi le in auction pricing, a base price is only a prel iminary one to the 
f inal IPO price. In principal, valuing IPOs is o f no difference f rom valuing 
other equities; the common approaches o f discounted cash f low (DCF) 
analysis and comparable firms analysis can be used, as we l l as economic 
value added (EVA) model. 
First, Discounted cash flow model: 
This model sums all the net present values (NPV) , wh ich is computed 
l ike this: discounting the after tax operating free cash f lows by the cost o f 
capital and deducting the book value o f debt, and the sum is the price. This 
model needs the forecast for the future cash f low, so some f irms w i th 
stabilized cash f low are feasible. Considering this, i t is not easy to make 
the forecast except a few industries. Recently some Chinese f i rms start to 
t ry the discounted cash f low model to price IPOs, such as: SinoPec 
(600028) and Minsheng Bank (600016), and many f i rms regard the 
discounted cash f low model as one important reference. 
Second, Comparable Firms Model: 
The essential thing o f comparable f irms model is based on PE pric ing 
method. W i th expectation that f irms in the same industry have similar risk, 
growth rate and accounting methods, comparable f i rms are usually chosen 
on the basis o f industry. We compute the median or mean o f PE ratios o f 
the industry, mul t ip ly ing per share earnings o f the IPO, and then we get the 
2 5 
IPO price or the base price. 
Third, Economic Value Added (EVA) Model: 
The term EVA is equal to after tax earning minus capital cost, wh ich 
is an indicator to evaluate the earning abil i ty o f the f irms and also can be 
used to compute IPO price and base price. However, i t is not popular as the 
other two methods. 
3.4 Conclusion of This Chapter: 
In this chapter, we review IPO activities in Chinese stock market and 
compare w i th the developed market in some fields. We point that CSRC is 
changing its role in this market and is transferring IPO activi ty f rom being 
regulated to market orientation. Since authorizing system is the watershed 
for China's stock market to develop, we think there w i l l be various 
innovations in the IPO pricing field. The book-bui ld ing mechanism w i l l 
give some reference to Chinese future IPO issuance. A n d the two improved 
auction systems, pr ic ing by the preset oversubscription and pr ic ing w i th a 
benchmark price w i l l be alternative for the issuers to f loat IPOs w i th a high 
price. In a word，a mature stock market should have various pr ic ing 




Empirical results and Analysis of Chinese IPO pricing: 
4.1 The Data and Research Methodology: 
1. Data: 
The sample o f A-share market includes 531 IPOs f rom 1996 to 2000, 
and the sample o f B-share market includes 44 IPOs f rom 1996 to 2000. 
Some observations lacking o f data are excluded. Data source is f rom 
Research Department o f Eagle Securities Co. Ltd. in China. 
2. Methodology: 
In China's IPO market, PE ratio is always an important factor for IPO 
pricing, and per share equity means whether the IPO is expensive or not. 
Hence, we w i l l check the effects o f PE ratio and per share equity and other 
factors including IPO size w i th proceeds as a proxy and industry dummy 
variables, in line w i th the proposition by Fir th (1997): the most popular 
value-assessment system includes per share equity (net asset) and PE ratio. 
The fo l lowing m o d e l ® are used to examine the factors effect on IPO 
pricing: 
Ln{IPO) = A) + A * Ln{PER) + P^ * Ln{EQU) + P, * Ln{PRO) + ^ p.X. + o • � 
1=4 
PER: PE ratio; EQU: Per share equity (book value); PRO: Proceeds as 
the proxy o f IPO size, equal to IPO pricex Shares; Z , : Industry dummy 
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variables, X^ is the industrial f irms; X^ is the conglomerate f irms; X^ 
is the commercial firms, other industry (Uti l i t ies) is eliminated to avoid 
mult i-coll inearity. 
Hypothesis: 
N u l l hypothesis: these variables have no impact on the IPO price, 
namely fi. = 0. And the fol lowings are H1: 
PER: PE ratio is the most important factor for IPO pricing, the higher 
PE ratio, and the higher the IPO price. So the relation should be positive 
between PE ratio and IPO price. 
EQU: Per share equity (book value): per share equity before going 
public is used. We expect that the IPO w i l l be sold more expensively i f 
there is more equity in it, so it is positive relation. 
PRO: Proceeds as a proxy o f IPO size, we expect the larger f irms have 
the lower IPO price, because it has a higher risk o f failure to raise the large 
proceeds, thus, the issuers w i l l set a low IPO price deliberately to ensure a 
successful issuance. So we think the sign o f proceeds is negative. 
X i : Industry dummy variables, X^ is the industrial f i rms; X^ is the 
conglomerate f irms; is the commercial f irms; other industry-Uti l i t ies 
is eliminated to prevent multi-coll inearity. I f the f i rm is industrial one, then 
the value o f X^ is 1, similar to X^ and X^. The impacts are ambiguous. 
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4.2 The Regression Results and Discussion: 
First, A-share Market: 
Taking model ① into A-share market, w i th evidence seen f rom table 
2, we can conclude that China's IPO price is h ighly related to PE ratio, per 
share equity and raised proceeds. The signs o f PE and per share equity are 
consistent w i th our expectation; however, the sign o f proceeds is opposite. 
Maybe the reason is that IPO price is equal to the product o f PE ratio and 
earnings per share. The large firms maybe have better earnings than the 
small size firms, and the earnings dominate other factors; thus they can 
convince investors w i th a high IPO price, contributing a positive relation. 
Among the industry dummy variables, only the conglomerate is significant, 
the sign is positive and the absolute value o f its coefficient is much larger 
than that o f the other dummy variables, which shows that the conglomerate 
f irms have a higher IPO price than other industries. 
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Table 2 
IPO Pricing Regression Results on A-share Market: 
Variable Exp.sign Param. Esti. t statistics Pr>|t| 
Intercept N A -1.19829 -4.55 <.0001 
Ln(PER) + 0.29183 7.25* <0.0001 
Ln(EQU) + 0.15569 5.70* <0.0001 
Ln(PRO) - 0.10810 8.26* <.0001 
I N D +/- 0.03548 0.83 0.4069 
C O N +/- 0.14386 3.03* 0.0026 
C O M +/- -0.01685 -0.26 0.7935 
H M ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B M B ^ B M S S I ^ B • ' f " ' j " M " J , S m S S ^ ^ B S S B 11 j J . S S S S S ^ ^ B S B K S S 
F statistics 35.77* Pr.〉F <.0001 
R square 0.2933 Adjust R^ 0.2851 
Note: Exp.sign: Expected sign; Param. Esti.: Parameter estimation. 
*: Denote significance at the 0.05 level. 
Since the IPO size has an opposite relation w i th our expectation, now 
we examine the scale effect o f IPO size on IPO price in details, and we 
divide the groups as the small, middle and large one. The fo l low ing table 3 
is the descriptive statistics o f IPO price grouped by the proceeds w i th 
cri t ical value: 2 x 1 0 ' R M B and 4 x 1 0 ' R M B . 
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Table 3 
Scale Effect o f IPO Size on A-share Market 
Currency: R M B 
Group Number Average Price 
Small 133 5.6357 
Midd le 211 6.1914 
Large 183 7.7498 
Total 527 6.5923 
- r — i T w r r I - i r r t t • - m M T - f m r r T — ~ ~ ••丨• . • _ . . _ . _ _ i — r i ' • • • 丨 • • ] i e • ‘ ' i ' ' ' - f c n • 1 1 , • ! 1 
F-statistics 40.5906* Pr.〉F <0.0001 
Note: Small: (0, 2x J; Middle:(2x 1 0 \ 4 x 10'J; Large: (4x lO ' ,+oo \ 
*: Denote significance at the 0.05 level. 
F test is significant, which shows that the difference between the 
groups are significant and IPO price o f large f irms is higher than that o f 
small ones, supporting the regression result o f IPO size test. 
Second, B-share Market: 
In the B-share market, as the shares are traded w i th foreign exchanges: 
US dollars used in Shanghai and Hong Kong dollars used in Shenzhen, we 
need to convert the foreign exchanges into R M B for the convenient 
comparison. Hypothesis is same w i th A-share market. Taking model ① 
into B-share market, the results can be seen f rom Table 4. The coefficient 
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sign o f PE ratio is consistent wi th our expectation, positive; however, it is 
not significant. Maybe the reason is due to the small number o f 
observations. And the coefficients of per share equity and proceeds are 
significant. Similar to A-share market, the coefficient sign o f per share 
equity is consistent wi th our expectation, while the sign o f proceeds is also 
opposite wi th our expectation. Compounded w i th the result o f A-share 
market, we can conclude large firms have a better and more stabilized 
financial status that can convince the investors to issue IPOs at a higher 
price. 
Table 4 
IPO Pricing Regression Results on B-share Market: 
— y - T—~—~=1 1 
Variable Exp.sign Param. Esti. t value Pr〉|t| 
Intercept N A -5.41835 -3.43 0.0015 
Ln(PER) + 0.21476 0.98 0.3358 
Ln(EQU) + 0.18613 2.43* 0.0202 
Ln(PRO) - 0.29150 3.21* 0.0027 
I N D +/- 0.07234 0.40 0.6906 
CON +/- -0.06887 -0.33 0.7397 
C O M +/- -0.41708 -1.23 0.2278 
F value 6.54* Pr.〉F <.0001 
R square 0.5148 Adjust R^ 0.4361 
- L = 1 — 丨 
Note: Exp.sign: Expected sign; Param. Esti.: Parameter estimation. 
*： Denote significance at the 0.05 level. 
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Then we check the scale effect o f IPO size on IPO price. The 
fo l lowing table 5 is the survey o f scale effect on IPO price grouped by the 
proceeds w i th crit ical value: 2 x 1 0 ' R M B and 4 x 1 0 ' R M B . 
The F test is significant and the scale effect is obvious, similar to the 
phenomenon o f A-share market. The result strengthens the argument that 
the large f irms can issue IPOs at a high price. 
Table 5 
Scale Effect o f IPO Size on B-share Market 
Currency: R M B 
Group Number Average Price 
1 丽r . r • — — — S ^ ^ ^ ^ S I . I i I I • “ ‘ — • • • • — I 111 U , I I I . . I • T^ I • ! , . I I I t I J ： 
Small 15 1.9863 
Midd le 18 2.9422 
Large 11 3.7852 
Total 44 2.8271 
F-test 12.9004* Pr.〉F <0.0001 
Small: (0, 2x l 08 j ;M idd le : ( 2x l 08 ,4x l 08 j ; Large: ( 4 x l 0 \ + o o ' . 
*： Denote significance at the 0.05 level. 
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4.3 Conclusion of This Chapter: 
In this chapter, we f ind that PE ratio, per share equity (book value) 
and IPO proceeds are highly related wi th IPO price both in A-share and 
B-share market. Most coefficients are significant except that o f PE ratio in 
B-share market, maybe because o f B-share data problem. The results are in 
l ine w i t h the f ixed pricing mechanism: PE ratio is an important element to 
IPO pricing, a high PE ratio meaning a high IPO price. The test on per 
share equity gives some evidence supporting Firth's argument. Whi le the 
result o f proceeds shows that the scale effect in IPO pr ic ing is obvious: the 
larger the f i rm, the higher the IPO price. 
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CHAPTERS: 
Theoretical Explanations of Underpricing Based on 
Chinese IPO Behaviors 
In this chapter, first, a quantitative way is introduced to calculate how 
much underpricing is the optimal choice, and then we examine whether 
some explanations for underpricing are applicable in China's emerging 
stock market. 
5.1 The Optimal Underpricing in China's Stock Market: 
Since the extremely high underpricing prevails in China's stock 
market, is it optimal and how much is optimal? We w i l l answer this 
question theoretically in a quantitative way. We assume that investors' 
estimation on IPO's market value is more l ike a un i form distr ibution in 
Chinese stock market than in other developed markets.⑧ 
A l l the investors subscribe the IPOs only when they th ink their market 
value p is larger than their cost, IPO price p^. We assume that they can 
make an assessment o f market value p w i th the comparable f irms or 
some other means. 
There are two kinds o f underwri t ing modes for the issuers to choose: 
one is the best efforts contract, and the other is the f i rm commitment 
® We suppose the estimation of the stock's market value in China is more like a uniform distribution than 
developed markets, considering the imperfect information disclosure, immature investors, and so on. 
Otherwise, the estimation should be more like a normal distribution. 
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contract. The difference lies in who undertakes the r isk i f the issuance fails. 
B y the best efforts contract, the underwriters promise to try their best 
efforts to market the offerings but they are not responsible for the failure; 
indeed, what they do is to provide some professional advice. A n d by f i rm 
commitment contract, besides their efforts, underwriters must buy out the 
left offerings i f failure. Obviously, the commission also makes much 
difference. We w i l l consider underpricing problems under the two 
conditions. 
The p is the market price assessment that is estimated by issuers, 
and we assume the estimation is unbiased, because issuers are involved in 
f i rm's operation day by day and know more about its prospects than do any 
other market participants, consistent w i th the modern f inancial theory: f i rm 
insiders know more than outsiders. The p^ is the IPO price. A n d the IPO 
price can be chosen at any level larger than zero. We assume that investors 
know the issuer's assessment p for the market value; however, they may 
choose to believe or not to believe; thus the estimation o f the market value 
is assumed to be a uni form distribution between 0 and p , wh ich also 
means subscription is un i formly distributed between 0 and p • Investors 
w i l l buy the offerings when Pq<p , and we suppose that the probabi l i ty o f 
a successful issuance is zero when Pq> p; and the successful probabi l i ty 
is equal to one when Pq=0. When Pq < p, we mark the probabi l i ty o f 
D — n 
success to be P r . = 尸 - " . T h e quantity o f IPOs is q . 
P 
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(1) Firm Commitment Contract: 
Most IPOs adopt f i rm commitment contract in China's stock market, 
so we w i l l consider this mode firstly. Indeed, i t is the underwriters that 
undertake all the risk and the issuers are guaranteed the proceeds. So when 
they compute the IPO price, underwriters w i l l consider their own gains and 
loss. I f the underwrit ing is successful, they w i l l receive the commission 
r - p Q - q , and r is the commission rate. I f unsuccessful, supposing only 
m • q offerings are sold, 0 < w < 1; they w i l l get the commission o f the sold 
IPOs, r - m - pQ-q, and need to buy out the left offerings; later the IPOs can 
be sold on the secondary market, so the payof f o f unsuccessful 
underwri t ing is r - t n - p ^ - q - Po • (1 - m) • ^ + j P • (1 - m) • ^ . The income 
function, Max ^ x rp^q + ^ x [rmp^q m)q + p{\ - m)q\, is faced 
P P 
before underwriters. From the first order condit ion, we can derive 
=pi\-m + r) Because the commission rate is usually much small 
2 ( l - m ) ( l + r ) 
1-2%, thus we can get the IPO price is approximately equal to hal f p， 
“ � 4 
(2). Best Efforts Contract: 
B y this means, it is the f irms that undertake all the risk, and the 
underwriters are paid the commission and needn't be responsible for the 
failure o f issuance. I f successful, the f irms obtain the proceeds p^q ； i f 
fai l ing, the f irms get nothing. Thus the f i rms' proceeds function is: 
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Max P —P。Xp^q + ^ x O ； first condit ion is as fol lows: 
P P 
q - 2。g = 0 => Pq =—p, similar to the result o f f i rm commitment contract. 
P 2 
1 — 
We can conclude that p 。 = 、 口 is the optimal choice to issue IPOs, 
under the assumption that the estimation for market price is un i formly 
distributed; and in other words, underpricing rate should be 100% in 
China's stock market. 
5.2 Empirical Tests on Some Theories: 
We w i l l test some underpricing explanations based on the Chinese 
IPO behaviors. Something w i l l be interesting under Chinese situation. 
1. Signaling Model: 
Signaling model is proxied by retention o f the shares or potential 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). The level o f retention o f shares by the 
or iginal owners can be a convincing signal o f f i rm value to outsiders. And 
Welch thinks SEO is also a signal to distinguish good f irms f rom bad ones. 
However, in China's stock market, almost all the f irms going publ ic are 
state-owned enterprises and it is a rule that more than 50% stake o f the 
shares must be owned by the state; thus, the discussion on the share 
retention level makes no sense. As for the discussion on SEOs, we think 
high-qual i ty issuers may attempt to signal their quali ty to distinguish 
themselves f rom the low quality issuers. In the SEO model, good quality 
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issuers deliberately sell their shares at a lower price than what the market 
believes they worth, wh ich deters lower qual i ty issuers f rom imitat ing. 
W i t h some patience, these issuers can recoup their loss by post-IPO activity, 
seasoned equity offerings (SEO) in future issuing activity. H igh qual i ty 
f i rms demonstrate that they are high quality by underpr ic ing their offerings. 
Thus, we expect that the f irms w i th SEOs usual ly have a higher 
underpricing. A n d also CSRC sets some criteria to guarantee that on ly the 
h igh qual i ty f i rms are quali f ied to issue SEOs. The core criteria request the 
l isted f i rms must have a continuous equity return rate more than 10% each 
year in three consecutive years, started f rom January 1996, wh i le a l i t t le 
lower to infrastructure enterprises, 9%. Then the criteria were revised in 
March 1999，which is loosened to an average equity return rate in three 
consecutive years more than 10% (9% special for infrastructure 
enterprises), but at least more than 6% every year. 
We ut i l ize Log i t regression model to see whether underpr ic ing rate 
(UR) and other elements affect the probabi l i ty that the f i rms to issue 
seasoned equity offerings and ut i l ize O N E - W A Y A N O V A to test whether 
group effect exists, namely whether the f i rms w i t h SEOs having a higher 
underpr ic ing rate. 
SEO (Y ) is a dichotomous variable: the value is 1 i f f i rms issue SEO, 
otherwise 0. The fo l low ing is used to estimate the relat ion between SEO 
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and UR. U R is underpricing rate; 
E{Y = \\UR) = P.^UR 
=> P{Y = = 
zz> P = + * . p is the probability to reissue. 
The above model can't guarantee predictive probabil i ty to fal l in the 
area f rom 0 to 1. So we introduce two Logi t models to estimate the 
probabil i ty by different variables: 
A _尸SEO � 
Ln{ PsEo ) = + A * PRO + p^PER 
1-户腳 ③. 
PRO is the proceeds raised by the f i rm, a proxy to IPO size. PER is 
the PE ratio, an important factor to IPO pricing. The reason why we 
introduce the second model is that we need other supports for the SEO 
theory; as PRO and PER both have relations w i th IPO price, maybe they 
can give some implications to the potential SEOs. 
For model ②，we expect a positive relation between U R and the 
probabil i ty to reissue SEOs, higher underpricing rate meaning a greater 
possibi l i ty to reissue SEOs, according to Welch's theory. For Model ③， 
we expect the relations o f PRO and PER both are negative; because IPOs 
w i th large proceeds have a low possibil i ty to reissue SEOs, considering 
their large demand o f capital involved; as for PE ratio, high PER means a 
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high IPO price, according to Welch theory, it has low possibi l i ty to reissue 
SEOs; so both the relations should be negative. 
F rom the test result o f model ②，seen f rom Table 6, we can see the 
estimation is not significant, though the sign o f underpricing is consistent 
to our expectation. A n d the test result o f model ③ shows the probabi l i ty 
is s igni f icant ly related to the IPO size - proceeds and PE ratio. The 
negative sign o f proceeds explains that the larger the IPO size is, the 
smaller probabi l i ty to reissue SEOs, consistent w i t h the nature o f China's 
stock market: large f irms have d i f f icu l t in raising large proceeds by placing 
a large number o f SEOs. The negative sign o f PE ratio can explain the 
f i rms w i t h a low PE ratio are more l ike ly to reissue, and low PE ratio 
means low IPO price. I t part ial ly explains the signal theory, because 
usual ly low IPO price induce a h igh underpricing. 
Table 6 
Logi t Regression Results: 
Variable F.xn. Sign Coefficient St. Error Chi-sauare P r � C h i S a | 
Model (2) 
Intercept NA -0.7649(4.356) 0.1756 18.9704 <0.0001 
UR + 0.0880(0.842) 0.1045 0.7093 0.3997 
Model (3) 
Intercept NA 11.7091(5.095) 2.2982 25.9576 <0.0001 
PRO - -0.4123(3.620)* 0.1139 13.0937 0.0003 
PER - -0.2638(4.228)* 0.0424 38.7506 <0.0001 
t-statistics are in the parenthesis. *: Denote significance at the 0.05 level. 
4 1 
We try another way to test the Signaling model, w i th one-way analysis 
o f variance ( A N O V A ) on the groups; SEO is the factor for grouping, one 
group w i th SEO, the other without SEO. 
And the group difference f rom A N O V A is not statistically significant 
(Table 7); the result also shows there is no evidence for the propensity o f 
high underpricing firms to float SEOs. 
Table 7 
One-Way A N O V A o f SEO Effect 
： = = = = = — I = = 
SEO impact Count UR Variance F P-value F crit 
SEO 183 1.469 0.6443 0.4202 0.5171 3.8591 
Without SEO 346 1.414 0.9785 
Note: UR: Underpricing. F Crit: F Critical value, denoting significance at the 0.05 
level. 
One reason for the non-significant test is that the duty o f China's stock 
market is to assist state-owned enterprises to reform, and the SEO becomes 
another tool for f irms to raise capital; and the intention to differentiate high 
qual i ty and low quality f irms by SEOs is not obvious. A l though the CSRC 
implements criteria to ensure the high quality f i rms to issue SEOs, f irms 
can colored their f inancial data by accounting methods, and we can see it 
f rom the interesting phenomenon®: quite a lot o f f irms have an equity 
� This phenomenon is called 10% or 6% phenomenon by Li, W (2000), "Listed firms: Perspective of Rate of 
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return rate just a l i t t le beyond 10% in their annual accounting reports 
between 1996 to 1999, and just a l i t t le beyond 6% after 1999, only a few 
are just below 10% or 6%, highly coinciding w i th the criteria that CSRC 
sets to guarantee the SEO's quality. Theoretically, the results should be 
randomly distributed. 
We can see that f rom the fo l lowing data: there are 211 and 152 f irms 
w i t h equity return between 10% and 11% respectively in 1997 and 1998, 
wh i le on ly 17 and 21 equity return between 9% and 10%. However when i t 
is in 1999，the number just over 6% suddenly increases to 81. This 
phenomenon implies that f irms have incentives to keep the SEO 
qual i f icat ion (Graph 1) by color ing f inancial data. Accord ing to L i (2000) 
research, non-regular earnings take up average 29.12% o f total prof i t 
among the f i rms w i t h equity return rate just beyond 6% in 1999. Actual ly, 
we must admit that there are lots o f h igh qual i ty f i rms issuing SEOs; 
however, in Chinese stock market, the low qual i ty f i rms can do this by 
decorating their f inancial reports. Thus the difference in the f inancial 
reports is not signif icant and the h igh underpricing is not the signal for 
SEOs any more; this is much different w i t h other markets because 
Signal ing explanation works in most developed markets; we th ink three 
reasons can explain why: (1) CSRC controls the pr ic ing, l i t t le 
independence lef t for issuers to decide IPO price; (2) The excessive 
Return, 6%", Chinese Listed Firms, Vol. 6. 
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demand for IPO makes the sales very easily, under this circumstance, most 
issuers w i l l choose a high IPO price;(3) The regulations on floating SEOs 
are not as strict as floating IPOs, hence, many low quality firms also can 
float SEOs by decorating financial data. The three reasons make the 
relation between the price and potential SEOs not obvious. 
Also, there is another phenomenon that the IPOs wi th small proceeds 
have the larger possibility to float SEOs comparing to large firms, only 
because small firms have less dif f iculty on SEO issuing than large firms. 
Graph 1 
Equity Return in Recent Years 
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2. The Impact of Underwriters: 
In the IPO underwrit ing, two things w i l l have effect on IPO price and 
the magnitude o f underpricing. One is the underwrit ing style: commitment 
contract versus best efforts contract, another is the reputation o f the 
investment banks. In China's stock market, nearly all the IPOs adopt 
commitment contract after 1996, so it is impossible to know the difference 
between commitment contract and best effort contract. As for the 
underwriter 's reputation, it is reasonable for us to believe that famous 
underwriters can give confidence to the investors and guarantee the quality 
o f IPO, subsequently, which means a high IPO price. Thus we wish to 
check whether investment banks reputation has effect on IPO price and 
underpricing. We choose the underwrit ing number o f each investment bank 
f rom 1996 to 2000 and ranks o f investment banks as proxies to evaluate the 
underwriter 's capacity and reputation. And, data is grouped by the 
underwriters whether they are among the top 10 investment banks. The 
fo l lowing table 8 tells that both the group effects on IPO price and 
underpricing are not significant, the reason is maybe because Chinese IPO 
market is a buying-dominated market, and the supply is not sufficient to 
meet the huge demand; thus, most IPOs can be sell out wi thout dif f iculty. 
Under this circumstance, the underwriters' reputation is not important for 
the IPO sell ing and won ' t have effect on IPO price and underpricing. 
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Table 8 
One-way A N O V A o f the Underwriters' Impact on IPO Price and 
Underpricing 
Underwriter's Impact on IPO Price 
Underwriters Count Average Variance F value P-value F crit(5%) 
Top 10 326 6.534 6.3083 0.5060 0.4772 3.8592 
Others 204 6.686 5.2998 
Underwriter's Impact on Underpricing 
Underwriters Count Average Variance F value P-value F crit(5%) 
Top 10 326 1.372 0.6511 3.7735 0.0526 3.8592 
Others 204 1.532 1.1849 
L = L _ ——.===J 
F crit: F critical value, denoting significance at the 0.05 level. 
3. Winner's Curse Test: 
Because o f investor divergence o f opinion in the oversubscribed 
offerings, M i l le r argues, once secondary market trading begins, the shares 
are reallocated towards the highest evaluators, and such divergence would 
appear to imply a "winner 's curse". I f the hypothesis is true, then the open 
price should be the highest price. And after it, the price w i l l decrease. Thus 
the price change o f the first trading day (closing price/opening price - 1 ) 
should be negative. 
We make the test under HO: the average price change o f the first 
trading day (closing price/opening price - 1 ) is 0. And test on A-share 
4 6 
market (table 9) supports the winner's curse, average change is so high 
-7% and T test is significant; however, the test on B-share market is not 
significant, though wi th a negative average price change, -0.445%. Maybe 
Mi l le r ' s argument f rom the buyers' behaviors is not a good explanation, 
and this phenomenon also can be explained f rom the seller's behaviors, 
f l ipping. Who gets the offerings in the subscription period fl ips shares once 
trading begins, and the f l ipping action puts downward pressure on the price. 
This strength causes the average closing price is lower than opening price. 
We can see the behavior f rom data o f Table 9: transferring rate o f A-shares, 
60.71%, is much greater than that o f B-shares, 14.92%. I t shows that most 
A-share IPO subscribers are the flippers, so the large f l ipping on the first 
day pushes the opening price down. Why are a large number o f shares 
f l ipped on the first day? The reason lies in that most IPO owners can obtain 
the great return f rom the underpriced IPOs when trading begins and they 
don' t want to wait longer. Whi le in the B-share market, the situation is 
different w i th A-share market, 14.92% shares are f l ipped, and the price 
change is not evident f rom T test. We can see that investors in A-share IPO 
market are immature comparing w i th B-share investors, most o f them only 
care about the f l ipping return and don't care long-run return; their 
behaviors add more risk and volat i l i ty to the secondary market, seen f rom 
the standard deviations o f A-share and B-share markets. Considering the 
fact that transferring rate o f A-shares is higher than B-shares, and, 
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subsequently, the price change o f A-shares is larger than B-shares, we 
th ink the f l ipping behavior is main reason for the price fal l ing on the first 
trading day. 
Table 9 
Test o f Winner's Curse 
Number TRA (CLS/OPN)-l St.d. T value Pro.>t 
A shares 528 0.6071 -0.07 0.1221 -28.118* 1.00 
B shares 44 0.1492 -0.00445 0.0766 -0.385 0.702 
丨  I I I I I I I 
Note: *: Denote significance at the 0.05 level. 
TRA is transferring rate, TRA二(Trading volume on the first day)/(total 
tradable shares); CLS is the closing price and OPN is the opening price on the 
first trading day. St.d.: Standard Deviation of price change (CLS/OPN-1). 
4. Extensive Presale Theory: 
This part maybe explains why underpricing is so high in China's 
emerging stock market. Extensive presale should indicate greater 
underpricing, according to Benvensite and Spindt (1989). We use lottery 
rate as a proxy o f extensive presale. Lottery rate is the ratio o f issued 
offerings to all subscribed shares, and we only discuss this issue on 
A-share market, because the IPOs are placed to institutional investors in 
B-share market, and we can't get the data about lottery rate. We believe 
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extensive presale, namely a low lottery rate, w i l l have relation to the 
extraordinary underpricing rate in A-share market. M o k and Hu i (1998) 
also propose that the extremely high underpricing due to the excessive 
demand for the l imited supply o f negotiable shares. 
Comparing wi th H-shares, we can get some ideas on the extensive 
demand in Chinese IPO market. The average lottery rate is less than 1% 
recent years in A-share market much lower than 3.22% o f H-shares, 
according to Zhao (1999); the demand o f A-share IPOs is two times more 
than that o f H-shares. We use the fo l lowing m o d e l ® to examine the 
relation o f between lottery rate and underpricing, along w i th PE ratio. 
ior = A+A ."及 + A-PER + cj® 
The definitions o f the variables are same as before: LOT: lottery rate; 
UR: Underpricing Rate; PER: PE ratio. 
We expect the relation o f L O T and U R should be negative, according 
to the extensive presale theory, low lottery rate meaning a high 
underpricing. 
The impact o f PER should be positive; i f PE ratio is high, meaning the 
offerings is relatively expensive, so there w i l l be less subscription, then the 
lottery rate w i l l higher. 
We can see the tests o f both coefficients are significant, f rom table 10. 
The relation between U R and L O T is consistent w i th our expectation, 
supporting the extensive presale theory. However the coefficient sign o f PE 
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ratio is opposite to the expectation. The empirical result tells that there w i l l 
be more subscription when the PE ratio is high, contrary to our common 
sense. Maybe we need to consider what f irms can issue IPOs w i th a high 
PE ratio; in China, usually the firms wi th a fast growth and high-tech 
content may float these high PE ratio offerings. It is not strange that 
investors prefer these shares much to others, expecting a beautiful prospect, 
which explains why the sign is opposite. 
In a word, evidence supports the proposition o f extensive presale, not 
only w i th in the China's stock market but also in the cross compare w i th 
H-shares. 
Table 10 
Extensive Presale Test 
Variable Exp. Sign Parani. Esti. t statistics Pr>|t| 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ！ ！ —~I 
Intercept NA 0.02209 8.76 <.0001 
U R - -0.0021 -2.22* 0.0270 
PER + -0.00037421 -3.40* 0.0007 
F value 8.93* Pr.〉F <.0001 
II * I 
*： Denote significance at the 0.05 level. 
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Why does such a low lottery rate exist in China's IPO market? 
CSRC needs to keep a low IPO price in order to prevent bubbles in the IPO 
market, leading the large price difference between IPO price and 
aftermarket price. As the risk for IPO subscription is low, some capital 
f lows into this market in pursuit o f the return. The fo l lowing Graph 2 
maybe gives us the implications. 
Define the rate o f return o f IPO subscription: R=Underpricing rate X 
Lottery rate, the Graph 2 including the subscription return rate o f f ive years. 
The return rate is in a decreasing trend, however, i f the fund can make the 
IPOs subscription continuously, then the return rate is sti l l quite higher 
than the deposit interest. I f only the subscription return is higher than bank 
deposit rate, the capital f low should be f rom the low return f ield to the high; 
the f low w i l l stop only when the subscription return is equal to the capital 
cost (opportunity cost, such as interest rate). 
Graph 2 
Average Return o f Single-time Subscription 
8. 0 0 % r i . - 可 
7 . 0 0 % .，v、$ ‘ V J . 
6 . 0 0 % 
5 . 0 0 % — g H 广 y 妙 d 
• • m o t 现 ‘ 敏 - 1 ， 
0. 0 0 % " " " " 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2 0 0 0 
51 
Subscription return and underpricing are interchangeable terms. A 
high subscription return leads to a large subscription; a large subscription 
leads a low lottery rate; a low lottery rate leads to a low subscription return; 
f inally, it reaches equil ibrium. Under the market principle, lottery rate and 
underpricing are the two endogenous variables in the system; i f only the 
underpricing rate is high, then the lottery rate w i l l be low by the market 
adjustment. Proof is as fol lows: 
Define, ur is the underpricing rate, namely, subscription return rate; 
a is the lottery rate; R is the opportunity cost rate: interest rate or other 
possible rate o f return. 
R 
When there is an equil ibrium: urxa = R=> a = — , underpricing rate ur 
and lottery rate are negatively related. 
Graph 3 
Lottery Rate Curve 
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I f the authorities wish to keep less capital in the IPO market, reflected 
by a h igh lottery rate, then the direct way is to decrease the underpricing 
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rate. Seen f rom the above Graph 3，if the underpricing rate declines f rom 
uro to u r i , then lottery rate w i l l increase f rom a 。 t o <2,. As a result, much 
fund w i l l be w i thdrawn and invested in other fields, creating more wealth; 







Empirical Results and Analysis of Underpricing in China's Market 
6.1 Underpricing in A-Share Market: 
1. Survey of Underpricing: 
General situation: 
Through the statistical Table 11, we f ind that the underpricing rate in 
A-share market is as high as 143.34 %(1996-2000). Comparing w i th Chen 
and Gao (1999), 335% (1991-1996), we conclude that China' stock market 
is turning more mature than ever; however, the underpricing rate is sti l l 
quite high comparing to the other markets (Table 12). The reason lies in the 
quota system: usually only a f ixed number o f IPOs can be approved to 
issue every year before 2001. As the supply is insufficient and the demand 
is extensive huge on the secondary market, the demand pushes the trading 
price up on the first trading day, resulting in the extremely high 
underpricing rate. 
Table 11 
Descriptive Statistics o f Underpricing in A-share Market 
Year Average 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
List number 106 27 182 95 96 130 
UR: a 1.433458 2.043197 1.494069 1.320337 1.132618 1.526789 
Lottery rate: 3 0.01203 0.034844 0.021736 0.007221 0.00751 0.004669 
PE ratio 18.56 17.38 14.92 14.11 16.85 28.43 
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Table 12 
Underpr ic ing in the Wor ld 
Country Thesis author Sample interval Sample number UR (%) 
Australia Leeetal. 1976-1989 266 11.9 
Belgium Rogiers et al. 1984-1990 28 10.1 
Brazil Aggarwal et al. 1979-1990 62 78.5 
Canada Jog&Riding et al. 1971-1990 258 5.4 
Chile Aggarwal et al. 1982-1990 19 16.3 
Finland Keloharju 1984-1992 85 9.6 
France Husson &Jacquillatetaj. 1983-1992 187 4.2 
Germanny Ljungqvist 1978-1992 180 10.9 
HongKong McGuinness 1980-1990 80 17.6 
Italy Chembini&Ratti 1985-1991 75 27.1 
Japan Fukuda&Dawson et al. 1970-1991 472 32.5 
Korea Dhatt et al. 1980-1990 347 78.1 
Malaysia Isa 1980-1991 132 80.3 
Mexico Aggarwal et al. 1987-1990 37 33.0 
Netherlands Wessels et al. 1982-1991 72 7.2 
New Zealand Vos&Cheung 1979-1991 149 28.8 
Portugal Alpalhao 1983-1987 62 54.4 
Singapore Koh& Walter 1973-1987 66 27.0 
Spain Rahnema etal. 1985-1990 71 35.0 
Sweden Ridder&Rydqvist 1970-1991 213 39.0 
Switzerland Kunz&Aggarwal 1983-1989 42 35.8 
Taiwan Chen 1971-1990 168 45.0 
Thailand Wethyavivorn&Koo-smith 1988-1989 32 58.1 
United Kingdom Dimson & Levis 1959-1990 2133 12.0 
United States Ibbotson et al. 1960-1992 10626 15^ 
Note: Sources from "Initial public offerings: International insights". Loughran, T.; 
Ritter, J.R. and Rydqvist, K. (1994). Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 2，165-199. 
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Scale effect of IPO size: 
In order to check the scale effect o f IPO size on underpricing, we 
grouped the underpricing rate by the raised proceeds: cri t ical value is 
2 x 1 0 8 r M B and 4x10®RMB. Also the scale effect is so obvious that the 
underpr ic ing rate descends f rom 195.9% to 102.7% as the f i rm size 
increases; F-test is much significant, seen f rom table 13; i t strengthens the 
proposi t ion that there is underpricing difference between the groups o f 
di f ferent IPO size. 
Table 13 
Scale Effect o f IPO Size on A-share Underpr ic ing: 
— r = ^ ~ = 
Group Number Average U R 
Small 133 1.959 
M idd le 211 1.410 
—— 
Large 183 1.027 
Total 527 1.433 
^ a — — t • I I I I " • ' •‘丨 1 1 ‘ ‘ “ ‘ • ‘ I • I I • = 
F-test 53.663* Pr.>F <0.0001 
Small: (0, 2 x l O ' J ; Middle: (2x 1 0 ' , 4 x 10 'J; Large: (4x lO ' ,+co ' . 
*: Denote significance at the 0.05 level. 
2. Empirical Results on A-Share IPO Underpricing: 
The data sample includes 531 IPOs in China's A-share market f rom 
1996 to 2000，and IPOs that lack o f data are excluded, data resource f rom 
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Eagle Securities Co. Ltd. 
The underpricing at A-share market o f Shanghai and Shenzhen 
exchanges are identical on statistical perspective, seen from non-significant 
test (The fol lowing table 14), so we treat them as a whole market. 
Table 14 
One-way ANOVA of Stock Exchange Effect on Underpricing 
Market Impact Count Average Variance F P-value F crit 
o e ^ ^ ^ ^ B B ^ B B ^ ^ ^ R S s ^ B 
Shenzhen A 260 1.45154 0.90399 0.19352 0.66018 3.85913 
Shanghai A 270 1.41605 0.82183 
Average: Averaged underpricing rate. F crit: F critical value, denoting significance 
at the 0.05 level. 
(1). Research Methodology: 
We divide the factors influencing IPO price into three parts: earning 
ability, market status and enterprise status. 
• The Earning Ability: 
We describe it w i th the fol lowing four independent variables, and T is 
the IPO year. X l=To ta l asset return ratio o f T-1 year ; (AssetT_l) ; X2=Total 
asset return ratio o f T-2 year;(AssetT_2); X3=Net Equity return ratio T-1 
year; (EquityT—l); X4=Net Equity return ratio o f T-2 year; (EquityT一2). 
We use the earnings o f the previous two years before IPO announcement, 
not the earnings forecast. Because China's companies usually overestimate 
their forecast earnings in order to gain a high IPO price, thus the forecast is 
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not much accurate for the information disclosure, wh ich is supported by 
statistical data that only 20% companies could reach the forecast. I f the 
forecast is unbiased, then 50% companies w i l l reach their goals.® In order 
to avoid multi-coll inearity, the variables are processed by principal 
component analysis (Table 15). The first two principle components (PCs) 
explain almost 90% o f the variation, and PCI focuses on the average 
earning whi le PC2 describes the increasing earning, seen f rom their 
coefficients. Thus we mark PCI and PC2 as AVE and I N C respectively. 
A V E describes average earnings and INC explains increasing earning 
ability. 
Table 15 
Principal Component Analysis for Earning Ab i l i t y 
Eigenvectors PCI PC2 PC3 PC4 
= = = = = = = « = = = = = = * = = - = = = = « 
Asset T-1 0.5163 0.2688 -0.6153 -0.5315 
Asset T-2 0. 5061 "0. 5495 -0.3169 0. 5832 
Equity T-1 0.4747 0.6943 0.3344 0.4252 
Equity T-2 0.5019 -0.3791 0. 6386 -0.4434 
Eigenvalue 3.04493 0.5489 0.35198 0.054164 
Proportion 0. 7612 0.1372 0.088 0.0135 
I L _ = — L _ 
� Zhang S. (2001), "Earning forecast is not usefi.il", "Finance and Economics" (Chinese, Caijing), 2001,3. 
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• Market Status: 
Market return= index o f first trading day/ index o f IPO day - 1: M K T ; 
List ing number (Number o f the newly listed f irms in the year when the 
f i rm went to public): N U M , this is an indicator o f market situation, i f a bul l 
market, the number is large and i f a bear market, the number is small; Time 
lag (Months elapsed between IPO announcement to going public): L A G ; 
Transferring rate: trading shares on the first going public day/total trading 
shares: T R A . 
• Enterprise Status: 
We use Ln(IPO proceeds) as a proxy to offerings size, and Ln(IPO 
proceeds) =Ln(IPO price X IPO shares). Variable name: PR O; Debt to total 
asset ratio: DBT; PE ratio: PER; Industry dummy variables (industries: 
IND; Conglomerates: CON; Commerce: C O M ; other industry (Uti l i t ies) is 
eliminated to avoid multi-coll inearity). 
Dependent variable: U R = CLS/IPO-1; IPO: IPO price; C L S Closing price. 
The multivariate linear mode l®: 
UR=p, + J3\AVE+ J3,INC+ /5,MKT+ J3,DBT+ J3,PER+ p,NUM+ p.LA G 
^ ⑤ 
(=10 
(X、，s are the industrial dummy variables) 
What determine the underpricing lies in two aspects: one comes f rom 
factors affecting IPO price, the other comes f rom factors affecting 
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aftermarket price. China mainly adopted f ixed pr ic ing mechanism to issue 
IPOs; PE ratio usually ranges f rom 12 to 15 before 1999. Whi le after 1999， 
PE ratio has a trend to rise. Thus, the IPO price is relat ively f ixed 
comparing to the aftermarket. Thus, we expect that underpricing rate w i l l 
be determined by the aftermarket price. Consequently, the factors that 
affect the aftermarket price should be significant. We w i l l examine what 
factors w i l l determine the underpricing. 
The fo l lowings are the hypotheses: 
H0\ The regressors have no effect on underpricing rate. 
HI of AVE and INC.. ambiguous relation. The earning abi l i ty is an 
important cr i terion to evaluate the f i rm's f inancial steadiness. The f irms 
w i t h good earnings can get a h igh trading price on secondary market and 
also w i t h a h igh IPO price, which w i l l dominate the underpricing is 
ambiguous. 
HI of PRO: IPO size is negatively related to underpr ic ing rate. The 
stock supply o f large IPO size is relatively more than the small ones, so it 
lowers the trading price on secondary market; f rom the former study, we 
know the large f irms have a high IPO price. Two effects contribute the 
negative sign o f parameter. 
HI of MKT', expected a posit ive relation. I f the market is bu l l market, 
then the investors w i l l have an opt imal tendency on the new trading shares, 
then price on secondary market w i l l increase. So the relation is posit ive. 
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HI of DBT: ambiguous. Most o f the firms have some debts, but the 
large debts w i l l potentially affect the profi t in the future, even bankrupt. 
Thus, the higher the debt to asset ratio is, the more r isk the investors are 
exposed to, and IPO price and aftermarket price both won ' t be high, 
however, we don't know which one dominates, so the result is ambiguous. 
HI of PER: The relation is expected to be negative. PE ratio describes 
the relation between price and earnings. A high PE ratio means a high IPO 
price on the first market. The gap between IPO price and trading price w i l l 
be relatively small, so a negative relation. 
H I o f N U M : Positive relation. The number o f f irms going public 
reflects the market capacity. Al though we think the large number o f IPOs 
trading on market w i l l disperse the fund on the secondary market, however, 
a large number o f IPOs going public only happen at the bu l l market, whi le 
at that t ime, the uprising market can attract more capital and enlarge the 
market capacity. This is one reason why bul l market leads more IPO 
activities. Bu l l market may be fol lowed by a high trading price. So there is 
a positive relation between the number o f going public and the 
underpricing. 
HI of LAG: The days elapsed between the IPO announcement day and 
the first trading day have positive effect on underpricing rate. When 
China's stock market is sti l l an emerging one, especially in the beginning 
o f 1990s, there is usually a quite a long t ime lapsed between IPO's 
61 
announcement and trading on the exchange. And it is a fact that fund is t ied 
up for a long time, such a long time increases the investors' risk and 
opportunity costs; thus a high open price is expected, wh ich means a 
positive relation. 
HI of TRA: positive relation. Boehmer and Fishe (2000) advanced the 
trading volume explanation for underpricing. They note that the higher 
trading volume on the first day, the greater is underpricing. I t is interesting 
to put the magnitude o f the underpricing and the trading volume into 
perspective. However, trading volume is an absolute value and it w i l l make 
l i t t le sense i f taking the IPO size into consideration. Maybe it is more 
convincing to use the transferring rate, a comparative variable, equal to 
trading volume/ total tradable volume. Transferring rate has an expected 
positive effect on underpricing rate; the trading price usually rises when 
there is an active trading, so a high transferring rate means a high trading 
price on the secondary market and a positive effect on underpricing. 
HI of Industry dummy variables: The effect of industry dummy 
variables is ambiguous. What industries w i l l have a higher underpricing 
rate w i l l depend on our regression results. 
(2) Results analysis: 
The underpricing rate depends on both IPO price and trading price on 
the first trading day. Thus, a high underpricing rate is determined by a low 
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IPO price or a high trading price or both. Considering that PE ratio is not 
h igh in the IPO market, hence, the IPO price is not much high. So the 
reason o f high underpricing is attributed to the high trading price, which 
reflects the speculative feature o f China's stock market. Under Chinese 
capital regulations, the market is isolated w i th other market, and it is 
forbidden for most people to invest in other markets, together w i th the 
scarcity o f investment alternatives, resulting in the large amount o f money 
f low ing into Chinese stock market. As the supply is l imited, it contributes 
to a very high price on the secondary market. Thus we expect the high 
aftermarket price is the direct reason for underpricing. 
As for the multivariate linear model, most signs o f the parameters are 
same w i th our hypotheses, seen f rom the table 16. Nevertheless, the 
coefficient sign o f PER is significantly positive, opposite w i th the 
expectation. The explanation for PE ratio (PER) is perhaps that usually 
high-tech enterprises can issue IPO wi th a high price, wh ich is welcome in 
the secondary market, and the investors on the secondary market would 
l ike to overestimate such enterprises. Thus the opt imism results in a much 
higher aftermarket price than IPO price; thus, it is a positive relation. And 
for the effect o f debt to total asset (DBT) , which is not significant. Maybe 
the investors don't care it, so they won ' t have the impact on underpricing. 
As for earning abi l i ty indicators, INC is significant and A V E is not, 
because A V E reflects the average earnings historical ly whi le INC 
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emphasizes the increasing return. Perhaps investors pay more attention to 
increasing ability, so it has impact on underpricing. Further, the sign o f 
INC is positive, which shows that INC's impact on the secondary market is 
greater than that on IPO market; causing a positive relation w i th 
underpricing. Test on time lag is also significant, wh ich is consistent w i th 
the proposition o f Chen and Gao (1999). Among the industry variables, 
only the parameter o f Conglomerate is significant, which shows this 
industry has a higher underpricing than other industries. Remembering 
coefficient o f Conglomerate is also significant in IPO pric ing test. The two 
reasons show that conglomerate firms are different f rom others in the IPO 
market. And as other factors are concerned, some factors that only affect 
aftermarket price are significant and consistent to the expectation, such as 
market return ( M K T ) , transferring rate (TRA) and time lag (Lag). I t shows 
that the high underpricing rate in China stock market is mainly determined 
by aftermarket price. 
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Table 16 
Regression Results o f A-Share Underpricing 
Variable Expected sign Parameter T value Pr>|t| 
Intercept +/- 4.79530 6.22 <0.0001 
AVE +/- 0.11095 0.75 0.4517 
INC +/- 1.08638 3.61* 0.0003 
PRO - -0.29670 -8.32* <0.0001 
MKT + 1.75032 5.25* <0.0001 
DBT +/- -0.21774 -0.94 0.3459 
PER - 0.02013 4.49* <0.0001 
NUM + 0.00319 4.22* <.0001 
LAG + 0.00601 5.24* <0.0001 
TRA + 1.98194 7.56* <0.0001 
IND +/- 0.02426 0.22 0.8566 
CON +/- 0.28131 2.28* 0.0412 
COM +/- 0.17466 1.04 0.3796 
F value 25.90 Pr.>F <.0001 
R square 0.3768 Aj. R-square 0.3623 
— t s — l l I • 1 
*: Denote significance at the 0.05 level. 
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3. Conclusion of This Part: 
China's stock market is an emerging one and underpricing rate is quite 
high. The main reason comes f rom the quite high price on the secondary 
market. The empirical tests give us some hints that China's stock market is 
a buying-dominated market and the aftermarket price is the principal 
strength to determine the high underpricing. Going w i th this, the financing 
function o f the market is very powerful, which give a large support for 
state-owned enterprises to reform. 
6.2 Underpricing in B-share Market: 
1. Survey of B-share market: 
B Shares are foreign exchange invested shares issued domestically by 
PRC's companies. B Shares are also known as Renminbi Special Shares. B 
Shares are issued in the form o f registered shares and carry a face value 
denominated in Renminbi. B Shares are subscribed and traded in foreign 
currencies: US dollars in Shanghai and Hong Kong dollars in Shenzhen, 
and are listed and traded in securities exchanges inside China. The B Share 
Market came into existence in 1991. B y the end o f 2000, there were total ly 
106 B Share issuers. There were 59 B Share companies listed in Shenzhen 
whereas there were 57 B Share companies listed in Shanghai. The B Share 
Market has attracted a considerable number o f foreign investors. The 
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market provides a channel for Chinese enterprises to raise foreign capital, 
thereby enhancing the progress o f the evolvement o f China's securities 
market. 
The fol lowing Graphs 4 & 5 are the B-share indexes respectively in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange: We can see the B-share market is 
much volatile and the bul l or bear market can last quite a long time. This 
situation is not good for firms to raise capital by IPOs. When it is the 
downturn, there are few firms wi l l ing to issue IPOs, seen from table 17: it 
is the lowest point o f B-share index in 1999 and there are only two IPOs in 
the year, also the lowest number; when it is a bul l market, then the 
aftermarket price w i l l be very high, increasing the investment risk. 
Graph 4 
Shanghai B-share Weekly Index 
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Graph 5 
Shenzhen B-share Weekly Index 
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From Table 17 & 18, we can know the general situation on B-share 
market; the number o f B-shares is much smaller than that o f A-share 
market and underpricing is much lower than A-shares, near to other 
developed markets. We can see that foreign investors are more rational 
than domestic investors. PE ratio is a l i tt le lower than A-shares and some 
IPOs obtain a negative first-day return, which means overpricing. And the 
scale effect o f IPO size on underpricing is not obvious, because the 
mid-size f irms have the highest underpricing. One interesting thing is that 
Shenzhen has a much higher underpricing than Shanghai. This is 
concerned w i th the fact that there are more individual investors in 
Shenzhen B-share market than in Shanghai, because many individual 
investors in Shenzhen come f rom Hong Kong; that is to say, Shanghai has 
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a higher portion o f institutional investors and a lower underpricing rate, we 
can get a proposition that institutional investors have one function to 
stabilize the market. This is also a feasible way for A-share market to 
diminish the excessive underpricing, by developing institutional investors. 
Table 17 
Survey o f B-share Market 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
Number in SH 6 8 2 2 1 19 
UR(%) 2.96 9.15 2.49 15.0 32.5 8.34 
p/E 5.83 9.28 6.28 5.42 8.5 7.51 
Number in SZ 9 8 3 0 5 25 
UR(%) 7.15 41.80 -2.93 NA 33.11 22.22 
p/E 3.72 8.11 7.08 NA 6.27 7.19 
I I I = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
Total Number 15 16 5 2 6 44 
UR(%) 5.48 25.48 -0.76 15.0 33.01 16.23 
P/E 5.69 8.70 6.67 5.42 7.97 7.34 
Note: SH: Shanghai Stock Exchange; SZ: Shenzhen Stock Exchange; UR: 
Underpricing Rate; Al l : Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges are integrated 
together. 
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The fol lowing table 18 is the survey o f underpricing rate grouped by 
the proceeds wi th critical value: 2x lO^RMB and 4x10® RMB. 
Table 18: 
Scale Effect o f IPO Size on B-share Underpricing 
I ' • • • I ' • ' • 
Group Number Average 
Small 15 0.1142 
Middle 18 0.2508 
Large 11 0.0827 
Total 44 0.1622 
F-Value 2.9049 Pr.>F-value 0.0661 
II : 丨  
Note: Small: (0, 2x 1 J ; Middle: (2x 1 , 4 x 1 J ; Large: (4x 10',+cx)". 
F-statistics: Denote significance at the 0.05 level. 
2. Empirical Results on the B-share Market: 
In respect o f the elements that have impact on the IPO price and 
trading price, we uti l ize the fol lowing m o d e l©： 
UR = P,+ P,RE\ + P^REl + pyPRO + J3,ABC + P.MKT + f3,DBT + p.PER 
- ⑥ 
+ P^NUM + P.LAG + p.JRA + [ 
/=ii 
p 




• Earning ability: 
We use the two-year data o f total asset earning ratio before the f i rm 
goes to public: R E l is the ratio one year before going public and RE2 is 
the ratio two years before going public. 
• Market status: 
Market return=Closing index o f first trading day/Closing index o f IPO 
day — 1: M K T ; Transferring rate: trading shares on the first going public 
day/total trading shares: T R A ; List ing number (Number o f the newly listed 
f i rms in the year when the f i rm went public): it is marked as N U M ; Time 
lag between IPO announcement and trading on market: L A G ; 
• Enterprise status: 
Offerings size: P R O , We use Ln(IPO proceeds) as a proxy to 
offerings size, and Ln(IPO proceeds) =Ln(IPO price X IPO shares); A B C , 
D u m m y variable o f A & B shares cross-listing, i f A share was issued 
earlier than B shares, then the value is 1, otherwise 0, wh ich is a proxy to 
test whether the listed firms can provide some information to later l ist ing 
and the impact depends on regression result; Debt to total asset ratio: DBT, 
the ratio is one year before IPO announcement; PE ratio: P E R , which is 
cited f rom the prospectus; X j is industry dummy variables (industrials: 
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IND; Conglomerates: CON; other industry (Uti l i t ies) is eliminated to 
avoid mult i-col l inearity; Commerce is omitted because there is no such a 
f i rm in the data); 
Chen and Gao (1999) has run the regression w i th variables o f earning 
abil ity, company size, age, total asset l iability, dummy variable o f A & B 
shares cross listing, dummy variables o f industries and so on, however 
most o f his tests on coefficients are not significant. And the result is near to 
random distribution. His explanation is that most foreign investors don't 
know China's enterprises, so they have no preference to choose stocks as 
their investment targets, which causes the random results. 
Turning to our result, the A N O V A shows that underpricing o f 
B-shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen is significantly different, seen f rom the 
\ 
fo l low ing table 19. Thus we can't treat them as a whole market and we w i l l 
discuss underpricing in the two markets separately. 
Table 19 
A N O V A for the Underpricing o f Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges: 
U R mean-SH U R mean-SZ F-Value Pr.>F-value F crit ical Value 
0.0834 0.2222 4.9328* 0.0318(Pr.>R) 4.07266(0.05) 
*： Denote significance at the 0.05 level. 
We run the regression w i th the above model respectively in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen B-share markets. And the impact o f explanatory variables 
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and hypotheses are similar w i th A-shares. Considering B-share market has 
fewer data than A-share market, we worry about the mult i-col l ineari ty and 
heteroscedasticity, so Variance Inflator Factor (V IF) and Condit ion Index 
are tests for multi-coll inearity; White's general test is for 
heteroscedasticity. 
The results f rom the fo l lowing table 20 & 21 show that moderate 
mult i -col l ineari ty exists and no heteroscedasticity exists. The coefficients 
o f RE2, M K T , PER, N U M , T R A and U T I are significant in Shenzhen 
B-share market, among these, only the coefficient sign o f PER are opposite 
to the expectation and the explanations are same as A-share market. Whi le 
in Shanghai B-share market, only the coefficient o f T R A is significant. We 
think Shanghai B-share market is more disordered and more l ike a random 
distr ibution than Shenzhen. 
We see the result that most estimators o f tests are not significant, 
especially in Shanghai and the values o f R square are high in Shenzhen and 
Shanghai B-share markets; one reason is that the number o f observations is 
l imi ted and the estimators are so many as to reduce the degree o f freedom, 
whi le another reason is due to some multi-coll inearity. The tests o f V I F and 
condit ional index show that there is moderate collinearity. 
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Table 20 
Regression Result o f Underpric ing in Shenzhen B-share Market 
n — “ r ~ — 
Expected sign Para.SZ T-Val. Pr>ltl VIF 
Intercept +A 2.18133 1.00 0.3364 0 
RE2 土 1.75740 2.32* 0.0385 2.34594 
REl 土 -0.88316 -0.82 0.4309 2.32975 
PRO - -0.22526 -1.70 0.1144 3.17255 
ABC +/- 0.22231 0.1299 1.93925 
MKT + 0.57521 2.93* 0.0126 1.33601 
DBT 土 0.50697 m 0.1136 1.50273 
PER - 0.09870 2.95* 0.0121 1.48398 
N U M + 0.02468 2.39* 0.0344 1.76372 
LAG + 0.00977 ^ 0.2329 2.10884 
TRA + 0.96788 2.24* 0.0448 1.69767 
IND 土 0.18303 m 0.2851 2.77745 
UTI 士 0.57631 2.43* 0.0320 3.20844 
R-Sauare 0.7553 AdiR-Sa 0.5105 
F Value 3.09* P r > F 0.0311 
White Pr>Whit 0.9222 
Cond.Ind 296.42744 1 _ _ _ J _ _ _ J 
VIF: Variance Inflator Factor; White: White Chi-Square test for 
heteroscadasiticity; Condition Index: test for multi-collinearity. 
*： Denote significance at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 21 
Regression Result o f Underpricing in Shanghai B-share Market 
Expected sign Para.SH T-Val. Pr>ltl VIF 
Intercept +!- 0.37357 0.98 0.3652 0 
RE2 土 -0.36198 -1.17 0.2861 4.89431 
REl +A 0.09151 ^ 0.7953 6.20700 
PRO - -0.01826 -0.79 0.4589 1.90814 
ABC +A -0.04207 -0.75 0.4827 2.42034 
MKT + 0.14186 0.58 0.5817 2.59730 
DBT 土 -0.34129 -1.85 0.1144 3.69832 
PER - 0.01961 1.47 0.1922 5.55669 
NUM + -0.00231 -0.72 0.4964 2.20002 
LAG + 0.00438 0.91 0.3995 4.34404 
TRA + 0.75235 5.68* 0.0013 1.76364 
IND +A -0.04324 -0.77 0.4724 6.01327 
UTI +/- -0.04258 -0.66 0.5331 6.53544 
R-Sauare 0.9232 AdiR-Sa 0.7697 
F Value 6.01* Pr >F Value 0.0189 
White 1 7 ^ Pr>Whit 0.6657 
Cond.Ind 149.32228 [ = 1 
*: Denote significance at the 0.05 level. 
Considering the significant difference in underpricing rate between 
Shanghai and Shenzhen (seen A N O V A result f rom Table 19), we add one 
dummy variable, X C H to the m o d e l ® . The introduction o f dummy 
variable X C H is to distinguish Shenzhen Stock Exchange f rom Shanghai, 
i f l isted in Shanghai, the value is 1, i f in Shenzhen, it is 0; thus we can 
combine the two markets into one and we expect that the coefficient is 
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negative, because the average underpricing rate o f Shenzhen is much 
higher than that o f Shanghai. After expunging some variables that may 
result in severe collinearity, we get the fo l lowing m o d e l ® : 
UR = P,+ P,RE\ + P^REl + p,PRO + (3, ABC + P.MKT + P,DBT + P,PER � 
+ P^NUM + p,TRA + P,,XCH 
However the coefficient o f X C H is positive, seen f rom Table 22, 
contrary to the expectation, and the test is non-significant. Maybe it is the 
problem o f the data l imitation. 
Most tests o f the parameters are not significant, and only M K T and 
T R A are excluded. The correlation between U R and M K T shows that 
market situation has some impact on underpricing rate. And as for TRA , it 
is significant and transferring rate is a criterion to examine the enthusiasm 
o f trading, usually the more active the market, the higher the price. As for 
the other parameters tests, they are non-significant, perhaps because most 
foreign investors have di f f icul ty in distinguishing the high quality IPOs, 
wh ich causes the underpricing rate is distributed randomly. From the above 
tests, only factors o f market situation are significant, such as M K T and 




Regression Result o f Adjusted Model 
Parameter T-Value Pr > Itl 
Intercept -0.11260 -0.11 0.9156 
REl -0.34191 ； 0.5959 
RE2 0.34847 0.5194 
PRO -0.02045 -0.36 0.7217 
ABC 0.02975 0.7151 
MKT 0.48947 3.00* 0.0051 
DBT 0.02046 ^ 0.9194 
PER 0.02636 0.1984 
NUM 0.00391 0.5281 
TRA 0.76002 0.0096 
XCH 0.23340 1.74 0.0918 
R-Sauare 0.5154 AdiR-Sa 0.3685 
F Value ^ Pr > F 0.0031 
VIF 170.68615 || 
*： Denote significance at the 0.05 level. 
3. Conclusion of This Part: 
B-share market has fewer observations than A-share market and most 
things are disordered. These problems add great di f f icul ty to our analysis. 
Under this situation, we can only say that the underpricing in B-share is 
l ike a random distribution. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Further Development of Chinese Stock Market 
Before we end this paper, we must point out that China's stock market 
is just an emerging one and inevitably has some defects that need further 
development; and among the defects, some can affect IPO underpricing 
much. 
7.1 Defects in Chinese Stock Market: 
(1) Market weakness: 
The stock market is immature, w i th problems o f market irregularities, 
price bubble w i th high PE ratios in the secondary market, poor disclosure 
o f information, over-speculative activities, strong pol icy influences, and so 
on. A l l these problems should be overcome as the market turns mature. 
(2) Institutional flaws: 
The stock market segmentation is the major obstacle to further 
development o f China's securities business. Investment funds and fund 
managers are underdeveloped; other securities intermediaries are far f rom 
international standards; considering the market-stabil izing function o f 
institutional investors, these institutions should develop in the future. And 
many listed companies sti l l suffer f rom inherent state-owned-enterprise 
(SOE) problems w i th poor corporate governance; the reform for SOEs 
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should be carried more intensely. 
(3) Legal weaknesses: 
Overall legal framework is sti l l weak; meanwhile, supervision is weak, 
w i th the Securities Law being just three years old and many regulations 
and rules needing supplementing, especially for many legal gray areas. 
We wish these problems could be dealt w i th successfully in the further 
development. This is an important and necessary step for the entire China's 
stock market to develop maturely. 
7.2 Further Development for Reducing Underpricing: 
Loughran and Ritter (1994) studied underpricing issue in 25 countries, 
and pointed: Average init ial returns tend to be higher (i) the greater is the 
degree o f government interference, ( i i ) the earlier a f ixed offer ing price is 
set in the process o f going public. The two problems also exist in China's 
stock market. Quota system and f ixed pricing mechanism take a long time 
in the IPO market; the two reasons result in the high underpricing, wh ich is 
just the result o f government interference and f ixed pricing. We think that 
authorities relaxing the regulation and transferring the power to market 
gradually w i l l help to reduce underpricing by some extent. 
Book-bui ld ing system and auction pr ic ing system can help value IPOs 
more accurately than f ixed pricing. Af ter the authorizing system is 
implemented, the issuers have more independence to decide how to value 
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IPOs. Under the new system, the book-bui lding mechanism and auction 
pr ic ing mechanism should be encouraged to develop fast. Then it helps to 




This paper studies IPO pricing and underpricing issues in China's 
stock market; we f ind that IPO price is signif icantly related to PE ratio and 
other factors, which is consistent w i th the f ixed pr ic ing mechanism that 
exists for a long time, and that the IPOs in China's A-share market are 
much more underpriced than B-share market during the period from 1996 
to 2000, and underpricing in B-share market appears more disordered than 
in A-share market. I f we trace the reason why IPOs are underpriced so 
much in China's A-share market, then we w i l l f ind the quota system and 
the f ixed PE pricing mechanism are the main reasons. Fortunately, the 
authorizing system (chartered system or verif ication system) substitutes the 
quota one. 
Evidently, the extent o f underpricing both in A-share market and 
B-share market is mainly determined by the aftermarket performance and 
also the quite high aftermarket price explains why underpricing rate is so 
high. Indeed, it is a di lemma for CSRC to make the choice between low 
IPO price and low underpricing. I f CSRC wish to keep the first market 
w i t h less bubble by constraining PE ratio, then the high underpricing is 
inevitable, and vice versa. From its recent policies, we can f ind the trend is 
to loosen the regulation on PE ratio. B y the trend, the issuers w i l l be more 
f lexible in IPO pric ing and more innovations w i l l happen in the pricing 
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mechanism. Thus, Book-bui lding mechanism and some proper auction 
pr ic ing mechanisms w i l l be developed and can reduce underpricing to 
some extent. Specifically, after W T O entry, China w i l l open the capital 
account sooner or later, then stock market w i l l face capital in f low and 
outf low; the IPO issue w i l l be very complex in China stock market. The 
studies on IPO activities w i l l be more interesting and challenging under 
these situations. This is also my wish for further study. 
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